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BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j) (1996) (Supp. 2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the priority status of the Medicaid

hen is valid under federal and state law?
2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the co-defendant law firm Robert B.

Sykes and Associates is not entitled to attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4)
because it failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7?

1

3.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the issue of Streight's

noncooperation in identifying liable third parties is immaterial because Streight and the
law firm failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7?
"Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law\" Jackson v. Mateus,
2003 UT 18, f 6,

P.3d

. Whether a trial court properly granted summary

judgment is a question of law. Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62,
f 14, 52 P.3d 1179. The appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of summary
judgment for correctness and accords no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.
State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 9, 999 P.2d 572. When reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, the appellate court reviews the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Houghton v. Dept. of
Health, 2002 UT 101, f 2, 57 P.3d 1067 (quoting Regal Ins. Co. v. Botty 2001 UT 71, f 2,
31P.3d524).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following relevant provisions are included in Addendum A.
a.

State Statutes:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5 (1998).

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-6 (1998).

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (1998).

2

b.

c.

State Administrative Rules:
1.

Utah Admin. Code R527-800-8 (1997).

2.

Utah Admin. Code R527-936-2 (1997).

Federal Regulations:
1.

42 C.F.R. § 433.147 (1998).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arose when the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services ("ORS") filed
a complaint against the Medicaid recipient Peggy Sue Streight ("Streight") and the law
firm of Robert B. Sykes & Associates ("law firm") under Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7
(1998). ORS sought reimbursement out of the third-party insurance proceeds paid to
these defendants for $107,363.70 in Medicaid funds paid to the health care providers who
treated Streight (R. 1-14). On May 18, 2001, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of ORS in a Memorandum Decision and granted a money judgment against the
defendants (R. 605). On June 11, 2002, the trial court denied defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration and entered a judgment and order incorporating its Memorandum
Decision (R. 845).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On June 9,1998, Peggy Sue Streight was severely injured walking across the street
in Gunnison, Utah when she was struck by a car driven by Sherilyn Christensen (R. 850).
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On June 17, 1998, Streight's father Orval I. (Bud) Jensen applied for medical assistance
on behalf of Streight, his adult incapacitated daughter (R. 850). On June 26, 1998, Jensen
completed a Medicaid Third Party Insurance questionnaire identifying Sherilyn
Christensen as the driver of the vehicle and Farmers Insurance as her insurance carrier (R.
565, 850). This Medicaid questionnaire was part of Streight's Department of Workforce
Services file, along with her applications for other types of assistance in addition to
medical assistance (R. 578). The Office of Recovery Services ("ORS"), the state agency
designated to pursue reimbursement for the Utah Department of Health's medical
assistance programs, had no knowledge of the document until it was sent via facsimile
from the Utah Department of Workforce Services to Carrie Worthen, an employee of
ORS on January 15, 1999 (R. 578).
On August 3, 1998, Jensen filed an additional application for medical assistance
and other assistance benefits on behalf of his daughter, Streight (R. 851). This
application contained an assignment to the Utah Department of Health (R. 230). In
addition to the assignment, this section in the application provided that, "[i]f the Utah
Department of Health pays for my medical care, I will give them any money I collect
from an insurance policy. I will also give them any money I collect from someone liable
for my medical expenses" (R. 230). Also in August 1998, Jensen retained the services of
the defendant law firm Robert B. Sykes and Associates on behalf of Streight (R. 851).
Jensen informed the law firm that he had applied for medical assistance on behalf of
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Streight (R. 851). On August 25, 1998, Streight was deemed eligible for medical
assistance retroactive to June 1, 1998 (R. 851). The Utah Medicaid program paid
$107,363.70 to various medical care providers who treated Streight's injuries (R. 852).
On September 17, 1998, Streight filed a petition for appointment of conservator
and for approval of the settlement of Streight's claims against the driver Christensen, her
insurer Utah Farm Bureau, and Streight's own underinsured motorist policy carrier Ohio
Casualty Insurance (R. 851). At a hearing, Sixth District Judge David L. Mower entered
an order approving the appointment of a conservator, approving the settlement and the
execution of a release of Streight's claims, and establishing a supplemental needs trust (R.
260, 851-852). The order approved the settlement of Streight's claims against Sherilyn
Christensen and Utah Farm Bureau for the vehicle liability insurance policy limits of
$100,000 and against Ohio Casualty Insurance for Streight's underinsured motorist policy
limit of $10,000 (R. 260, 851-852). The order allowed $38,030.92 of the settlement
funds to be paid to the Sykes law firm as attorney fees and costs (R. 263, 852). Streight's
conservators agreed to release her claims against the driver and insurance carriers for
payment of the insurance policy limits (R. 452).
On September 28, 1998, five days after the hearing and court approval of the
settlement, Jensen contacted ORS requesting a copy of the medical bills paid to that date
on behalf of Streight (R. 852). On September 30,1998, ORS responded to the request
and faxed a list of the medical bills paid by Medicaid (R. 852). On January 15,1999,
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Carrie Worthen, an ORS employee, had a telephone conversation with Orval Jensen in
which Jensen admitted three things (R. 362). First, he admitted that he informed the
Sykes law firm about the Medicaid application, at which time the law firm informed him
of a pending Medicaid reimbursement case at the Utah Supreme Court (R. 363). Second,
he admitted that he and the law firm wanted to put the settlement proceeds into a
supplemental needs trust before Medicaid began paying any of Streight's medical
expenses that would be submitted by her medical care providers on the premise that
Medicaid was entitled to reimbursement only for expenses it had actually paid before
those third-party proceeds were placed into a supplemental needs trust (R. 109-112, 363,
521). Finally, he admitted that when Medicaid started paying Streight's medical
expenses, the law firm advised him that it was too much to repay, and he agreed to place
the proceeds into the trust without paying the Medicaid lien (R. 363).
Neither Streight, her conservators, nor attorneys requested written consent of the
Office of Recovery Services or the Department of Health before filing or settling the
claims with third parties (R. 363). Neither ORS nor the Department of Health was sent
notice of the petition for approval of the settlement or the hearing on the petition (R. 452).
The petition specifically set out that "[t]here are no other persons interested in Peggy
Sue's estate who are entitled to notice pursuant to law, other than the natural parents and
guardians, Bud and Karen Jensen" (R. 452). Therefore, Streight, her conservators and
her attorneys failed to seek or obtain consent to file a claim for medical costs from the
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Office of Recovery Services before settling the claims with third parties (R. 852). No
authorized representative of the Office of Recovery Services or Department of Health
either granted or denied consent to Streight, her conservators or her attorneys to file a
claim for medical expenses paid by the Medicaid program (R. 578-579).
The Utah Medicaid program was billed $176,143.22 by various medical providers
for the treatment of Streight's injuries (R. 754, Ex. G f 30) but it paid $107,363.70 to
satisfy those bills (R. 852). ORS demanded reimbursement for the Medicaid claim out of
the third-party proceeds paid to Streight and the law firm (R. 852). Both defendants
refused to pay the Medicaid claim out of the settlement proceeds (R. 852). The State filed
the complaint in this case on November 22, 1999 (R. 85). Upon ORS's motion, the trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the State for full reimbursement of Medicaid
payments made on behalf of Streight. The court entered judgment against Streight in the
amount of $69,332.78 and judgment against Robert B. Sykes and Associates in the
amount of $38,030.92, the amount the law firm was paid from the third-party proceeds.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The issue of the validity of the Medicaid claim's priority status has been resolved
by Houghton v. Department of Health, 2002 UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067, cert denied 538 U.S.
, 123 S. Ct. 1632, 71 USLW 3519 (March 31, 2003). The law firm is not entitled
to an attorney fee from ORS because it failed to comply with the requirements set out in
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (1998). The facts of the instant case do not fall within the
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three recovery methods set out in State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d 572 and
therefore McCoy does not apply here. The Medicaid recipient in McCoy complied with
the statutory requirements in Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7, whereas Streight and the law
firm did not comply with section 26-19-7 because they failed to seek consent from ORS,
failed to specifically exclude the Medicaid claim from the settlement, and settled for all
available third-party insurance proceeds which prejudiced the Medicaid claim for
reimbursement against the liable third parties.
The issue of whether Streight cooperated in identifying third-party information is
not an issue of material fact preventing summary judgment because Streight and the law
firm failed to comply with section 26-19-7. Even if it were a material fact, Streight failed
to satisfy the cooperation requirements set out in 42 C.F.R. § 433.147 (1998), because she
did not provide third-party identification to the proper agency, ORS, and failed toiorward
third-party proceeds to reimburse Medicaid. Streight's and the law firm's actions, by
failing to comply with section 26-19-7 and to cooperate with ORS, prejudiced the
Medicaid claim for reimbursement against the third parties. The third parties had no
notice of the Medicaid claim at the time of settlement and ORS no longer had the right to
proceed against the third party under Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(3). At that point, ORS's
only available method of recovery was against Streight and any other party to whom the
proceeds were paid. Streight and the law firm are not entitled to a contribution of
attorney fees from ORS when their unlawful acts prejudiced the Medicaid priority claim.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE'S PRIORITY CLAIM ON THIRD-PARTY PROCEEDS
IS VALID AND DOES NOT VIOLATE FEDERAL LAW.

Under Utah law, the Medicaid lien against proceeds paid by third parties is not a
lien placed on the recipient's property because those proceeds do not become property of
the recipient until after Medicaid is reimbursed. State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 10,999
P.2d 572; S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439,442 (Utah 1998); Wallace v. Estate of Jackson, 972
P.2d 446,448 (Utah 1998). Since the proceeds are not the Medicaid recipient's property,
the priority nature of the lien does not encumber the recipient's property even if the
proceeds include payment for the nonmedical claims of the recipient. Houghton v.
Department of Health, 2002 UT 101, f 9, 57 P.3d 1067; McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 12. Even
though this law is now well settled, defendants have raised this issue in their brief based
on Petitions for Certiorari pending before the U.S. Supreme Court in both Houghton and
in Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2002), petition for cert, filed, 71
USLW 3116 (U.S. Minn. July 19, 2002)(No. 02-117).
The U.S. Supreme Court denied the Medicaid recipient's Petition for Certiorari in
Houghton on March 31, 2003. Houghton, 538 U.S.

, 123 S. Ct. 1632, 71 USLW

3519 (U.S. Utah March 31, 2003)(No. 02-1102). The Petition for Certiorari in the Martin
case is still pending but Martin is not controlling in Utah. This Court declined to abandon
its own "well-established precedent in favor of the Martin approach." Houghton, 2002
UT101,19n.5.
9

II.

CO-DEFENDANT LAW FIRM FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
SECTION 26-19-7 AND, THUS, IS NOT ENTITLED TO A
CONTRIBUTION OF ATTORNEY FEES FROM THE ORS.

The law firm is not entitled to attorney fees because Streight and the firm failed to
comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (1998). Under subsection
26-19-7(l)(a), a Medicaid recipient "must seek the State's consent before attempting to
recover from a third party for any medical costs paid by the State." McCoy, 2000 UT 39,
f 14. Streight and the law firm argue that the law firm is entitled to attorney fees from
ORS under McCoy regardless of whether or not they complied with section 26-19-7.
However, McCoy is distinguishable from the instant case because the Medicaid recipient
in McCoy, unlike Streight, complied with section 26-19-7. By failing to comply with
section 26-19-7, Streight and her attorney prejudiced the Medicaid claim against the third
party thereby foreclosing all avenues of recovery except against Streight, the Medicaid
recipient. An award of attorney fees would reward Streight and her attorney for refusing
to comply with section 26-19-7.
As a condition of Medicaid eligibility, Streight assigned, by operation of law, all
payments from third parties otherwise to or on behalf of her to the Utah Department of
Health. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-4.5 (1998). See S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah
1998). The Medicaid recipient assigns to the State that portion of any third-party
recovery equal to the amount of medical assistance she receives. Wallace v. Estate of
Jackson, 972 P.2d 445,558 (Utah 1998). The assignment authorizes the Department of
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Health to submit its claim for reimbursement up to the amount of medical assistance it has
provided. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(l)(a) (1998). 5.5., 972 P.2d at 442.
The Utah Department of Health must take all reasonable measures to ascertain any
third parties who may be legally liable for medical payments which the Medicaid Program
would otherwise pay. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (1999). The Office of Recovery
Services ("ORS") administers the Third Party Liability Program by identifying and
collecting these Medicaid claims for the Department of Health. ORS has adopted the
federal regulations governing this program. Utah Admin. Code R527-936-2 (1997).
Except for attorney fees payable under section 26-19-7, the Medicaid claim is a
lien on all third-party proceeds and has priority, over all other claims, to the proceeds
including the Medicaid recipient's claim. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(l)(b) (1998). The
priority lien provides the mechanism to ensure that the State!& Medicaid program wilLbe
fully reimbursed out of the third-party proceeds to the fullest extent possible. This lien is
against the entire settlement proceeds, even if portions of the proceeds are designated as
payment for something other than medical expenses. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 12.
The Department, through ORS, also has a right to commence its own action
against the third party for the recovery of medical assistance if the third party receives
written notice of the Medicaid lien before settlement with the recipient or if the third
party has actual knowledge of the medical assistance. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(3)
(1998). ORS must provide written notice of its action to the Medicaid recipient and the
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recipient may intervene in ORS's action at any time before trial. Utah Code Ann. § 2619-6(1998).
An action commenced by ORS does not bar an action by the recipient for
nonmedical damages. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(5) (1998). ORS has an unconditional
right to intervene in the recipient's action. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(l)(b) (1998).
However, this does not give the recipient a right to settle nonmedical claims without first
complying with section 26-19-7 because a priority lien exists on those third-party
settlement proceeds. Recoveries from third parties liable for the same expenses covered
by Medicaid belong to the State. 5.5., 972 P.2d at 443.
The Medicaid recipient may not file a claim or commence an action for recovery of
medical costs of the same injury or disease for which the Department provided medical
assistance without the written consent of the Department or ORS. Utah Coda Ann^§-2619-7(l)(a) (1998). Section 26-19-7 protects both the liable third party as well as the State
"from ill-informed or devious actions by the recipient." 5.5., 972 P.2d at 441. It also
ensures that the recipient's preemptive action does not cost the State its right to thirdparty payments which are in settlement or are already in the hands of the beneficiary. Id.
If the recipient proceeds without ORS's written consent, the Department is not bound by
any decision, judgment or settlement, and it may recover the medical assistance it
provided from either the recipient or from any party to whom the proceeds were made
payable. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(2)(a). "Payments made by a third party do not
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legally become property of the recipient until after a valid settlement which necessarily
must include reimbursement to Medicaid." S.S., 972 P.2d at 441.
Under subsection 26-19-7(4), ORS incurs attorney fees in Medicaid
reimbursement cases by either contributing to the cooperative Medicaid recipient's
attorney fees or by pursuing payment using its own lawyers. Office of Recovery Services
v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 19, 999 P.2d 572. If an attorney wishes to represent Medicaid
recipients, he or she is legally obligated under subsection 26-19-7(4) to contact the
Department of Health or its designee, ORS, and sign a written agreement to protect the
State's interest in obtaining reimbursement from damages payable by third parties.
Houghton v. Department of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1998). Section 26-19-7
anticipates the payment of attorney fees to a Medicaid recipient only if the recipient
complies with that section and does not preclude ORS from collecting the Medicaid claim
from the third party.
Pursuant to section 26-19-7, ORS must pay attorney fees under three different
circumstances. First, the State may take action directly against the third party and pay its
own attorney fees. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, <][ 19. Second, it may grant consent to the
recipient and pay attorney fees to the recipient. Id. Third, it may refuse consent and
pursue the recipient for a share of the proceeds and pay attorney fees to the recipient. Id.
Under these criteria, ORS must pay the Sykes law firm only if thefirmhad sought
consent and received it or sought consent and been denied.
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McCoy ensured that ORS could not snub the recipient's attempt to follow the law
and to cooperate with the agency. Under McCoy, if ORS refuses to give consent to the
Medicaid recipient with the intention of pursuing the third party directly, but then chooses
to proceed against the recipient instead of the third party, ORS must pay an attorney fee to
the recipient. McCoy did not, as the law firm argues, require that no matter the avenue of
recovery elected by the State, it must always pay its fair share of attorney fees to the
recipient's attorney for recovery on a settlement procured by counsel (Aplt. Br. at 8-9).
The recipient in McCoy did not preclude ORS's choice of recovery method and that point
is key to the difference between McCoy and this case.
In McCoy, the Medicaid recipient, through his attorney John McCoy, requested
consent to pursue the Medicaid claim on behalf of ORS. McCoy, 2002 UT 39, f 3. In a
letter to Mr. McCoy, ORS denied consent, stating that it would seek full recovery.of the
Medicaid claim directly from the third party. Id. Mr. McCoy then provided notice to
ORS that he would not include the Medicaid claim in the recipient's claim against the
third party. Id. Mr. McCoy also notified the third-party insurer that he was not seeking
to recover medical costs paid by Medicaid and expressly excluded the State's claim from
settlement negotiations. Id. at f 5. This Court held that ORS was required to pay the
recipient an attorney fee because ORS's actions fell under the third circumstance, i.e.
ORS denied consent and then pursued reimbursement from the Medicaid recipient after
settlement. Id. at f 18. This Court found that by requesting consent and then expressly
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excluding the State's claim from settlement after denial of consent, Mr. McCoy complied
with the requirements of the Medical Benefits Recovery Act in Utah Code Ann. §§ 2619-1 through -19 (1998). Id. It is this fact that distinguishes McCoy from the instant
case. Here, unlike McCoy, the Sykes law firm and Streight failed to comply with Utah
Code Ann. §§ 26-19-5 and -7. Unlike McCoy, the law firm failed to seek consent from
ORS (R. 363).
Along with failing to seek or obtain consent, defendants failed to comply with
additional requirements. Unlike Mr. McCoy, the law firm failed to notify the Office of
Recovery Services about the existence of third-party proceeds. Also, unlike Mr. McCoy,
the law firm failed to notify the third party of the impending Medicaid claim. Here,
unlike McCoy, the law firm failed to notify ORS and the third parties that it was expressly
excluding the Medicaid claim from Streight's claim for damages. In fact, thelawJSrm
did exactly the opposite by misleading the probate court in its petition for Appointment of
Conservatorship by stating that "[t]here are no other persons interested in Peggy Sue's
estate who are entitled to notice pursuant to law, other than the natural parents and
guardians, Bud and Karen Jensen" (R. 452).
If notice of the petition had been given to ORS as required by Utah Code Ann. §§
75-5-405(2) and 75-5-406, it would have prevented the State's claim from being
prejudiced; this is key to the McCoy decision. McCoy was awarded attorney fees because
he complied with the law and his actions did not prejudice the ORS claim against the
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third party. Here, unlike Mr. McCoy, the law firm failed to notify ORS of Streight's
settlement for all available insurance proceeds. It was Jensen, Streight's father, who
finally contacted the Office of Recovery Services, but only after the settlement had been
approved and the proceeds paid into the supplemental needs trust (R. 362, 852).
Here, the facts do not fall under any of the three recovery methods set out in
McCoy. First, ORS was precluded from directly pursuing the third-party insurance
company because it paid the insurance policy limits for a release of all claims before ORS
or the Medicaid recipient put the third party on notice of the Medicaid claim (R.260, 851852). Second, Streight and the law firm never sought consent, so ORS never had the
opportunity to grant consent and then later pay the law firm an attorney fee under a
written agreement. Third, since Streight never sought consent, ORS never had the
opportunity to deny consent and then choose to pursue reimbursement from the. recipient
instead of the third party. In fact, four and Vi years after the settlement and at
considerable expense in attorney fees paid by ORS to its own lawyers, Streight has still
not paid the Medicaid lien out of the third-party settlement proceeds. l
Additionally, McCoy did not overrule or criticize Camp v. Office of Recovery
Services, 779 P.2d 242 (Utah App. 1989). The facts in the instant case are more

1

Unlike McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 5, and Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 119
P.2d 242, 243 (Utah App. 1989), Streight did not place the settlement amount in a trust
account in order to resolve the legal issues regarding the lien but instead quickly placed
the funds in a supplemental needs trust in order to avoid satisfying the Medicaid lien (R.
363).
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analogous to the facts in Camp than to the facts in McCoy. In Camp, the Medicaid
recipient, a daughter of Camp, was critically injured in a car accident and died six days
later after incurring $39,000 in medical expenses. Camp applied for medical assistance to
pay those expenses, but was denied because her application form did not contain the
signature of a witness. Id. The following day, she retained counsel to file a claim for
damages with the insurer. Id. at 244. The insurer verbally offered to settle for the policy
limits. Id. One day later, Camp reapplied for medical assistance and was deemed
eligible. Id. Medicaid then paid $15,018.41 in full satisfaction for her daughter's
outstanding bills. Id.
ORS learned of the proposed settlement and notified Camp's attorney of its claim.
Id. Camp signed a settlement agreement, deposited the settlement check in a trust
account and then commenced a declaratory action to determine her rights to the proceeds.
Id. The trial court determined that Camp incurred $91,554 in special and general
damages and that the Medicaid claim represented 16.5% of those damages, thus the State
was entitled to 16.5% of the $20,000 settlement proceeds or $3,280. Id. The Utah Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that when the recipient proceeds against a
third party without ORS consent, and the claim includes medical expenses, subsection 2619-7(2) applies. Id. at 246. The court also held that Camp was not entitled to an offset of
the Medicaid lien for a contribution of fees under a version of subsection 7(4) which has
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now been amended.2
The court recognized "the legislative intent to prevent Medicaid recipients from
obtaining double recovery." Id. If the recipient was not required to seek consent under
section 26-19-7 in order to be awarded attorney fees, "recipients would be rewarded for
proceeding in contravention of the statute." Id. at 247. This is exactly what happened in
the instant case. Streight failed to seek or obtain consent from ORS and settled her claims
for the entire policy limits and placed all available third-party proceeds into a
supplemental needs trust without notice to ORS.
In their brief, Streight and the Sykes law firm allege that ORS would
systematically deny consent to Medicaid recipients and then intentionally refuse to pursue
the claim because it was not equipped to handle the claims, wait for the recipient to settle,
then step in and seek full reimbursement without paying an attorney fee (Aplt. Br: at 1011). Defendants do not specifically set forth why this disputed allegation would be an
issue of material fact preventing summary judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). It
simply seems to be an excuse why the recipient and law firm failed to seek the required
consent. Defendants fail to provide any supporting case law excusing them from
complying with the statutory requirements of section 26-19-7.

2

This version of section 26-19-7 allowed a payment of attorney fees only if an
action had been commenced with the State's consent. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(1984)
(amended 1989 and 1998). It was amended during the course of the Camp litigation.
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Defendant's allegation is not only immaterial but is also untrue. During the
months of December 1999 through February 2000, the three months preceding the McCoy
decision, ORS entered into 43 collection/attorney fee agreements with Medicaid
recipients. Of those 43 agreements, ORS obtained recovery on 27, with a net collection
amount of $263,706.07 after paying out $126,732.59 in attorney fees (R. 754, Ex. G).
During those same months, ORS collected $157,940.47 directly from liable third parties
without any attorney involvement other than ORS's counsel in the Utah Attorney
General's Office (R. 754, Ex. G).
Streight settled for policy limits without notifying the third parties of the Medicaid
claims, thereby effectively precluding ORS's claim against the third party. Practically
speaking, there are no other insurance proceeds or policies from which ORS can recover.
Unlike McCoy, Streight never put the third-party insurance companies on notice that
Medicaid also had a claim against the proceeds. Now, ORS's only recourse is against
Streight as the Medicaid recipient. ORS should not be required to contribute to attorney
fees on claims not yet recovered and when it has been forced to incur attorney fees for its
own lawyers in attempting to recover the proceeds that the Medicaid recipient unlawfully
kept.

3

Although not cited in defendants' brief, the record includes two other affidavits
apparently in support of this allegation (R. 679, 699). However, ORS submitted counteraffidavits, including ORS policy that contradicted defendants' affidavits (R. 754 Ex. G
and Ex. J).
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Despite the defendants' attempt to rationalize their failure to obtain consent, their
actions have prevented ORS from collection of its claim and have caused ORS to incur
attorney fees in seeking to collect the same. To allow payment of the law firm's fees
would encourage the Medicaid recipients to disregard section 26-19-7. It would
effectively force ORS to contribute attorney fees to the Medicaid recipient rather than use
its own resources to recover the claim even in cases where the only unresolved issues do
not affect the Medicaid claim for reimbursement.
Streight should not benefit from her own unlawful actions. If she had wanted a
contribution of attorney fees, she was required to seek consent. McCoy provides
guidance to a Medicaid recipient when ORS refuses consent. The law firm only needed
to comply with section 26-19-7 and McCoy to protect its client and to be entitled to an
attorney fee. It chose not to seek consent. At-the-very minimum, defendants could have
and should have provided notice to ORS of the conservatorship petition and hearing to
allow ORS to make a claim to the proceeds. Her own actions forced ORS to file a
judicial action because she settled the case, deposited the funds into a supplemental needs
trust and then refused to pay the Medicaid claim upon ORS's demand.
III.

STREIGHT'S NONCOOPERATION IN IDENTIFYING LIABLE
THIRD PARTIES IS IMMATERIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANTS
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 26-19-7.

Defendants' argue that the law firm is entitled to attorney fees because Streight
cooperated with ORS by identifying liable third parties. However, Streight's cooperation
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(or lack of it) is immaterial to the attorney fee issue because she and the law firm failed to
comply with the requirements of section 26-19-7. Even if Streight's cooperation is a
material fact, the trial court concluded that Streight's modest efforts did not amount to the
level of cooperation required by 42 C.F.R. § 433.147 (1998) (R. 923).
A state Medicaid agency must require a Medicaid recipient to cooperate in
identifying and providing information to assist the agency in pursuing third parties
responsible for paying for the Medicaid recipient's medical care. 42 C.F.R. §
433.147(a)(2) (1998). Utah requires all Medicaid recipients to cooperate by providing
information regarding third parties who may be liable for the recipient's medical
expenses. Utah Admin. Code R527-800-8 and R527-936-2 (1997). A Medicaid recipient
must also cooperate by paying to the agency proceeds that are covered by the assignment
of rights. 42 C.F.R. § 433.147(b)(4) (1998).
In McCoy, this Court specifically refrained from ruling on the issue of whether
ORS must pay attorney fees to a recipient whose failure to cooperate prevents ORS from
recovering from the third party. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 18 n. 4. The instant case is just
that situation. McCoy emphasized that the Medicaid recipient has a duty to seek consent
under section 26-19-7 and to cooperate with ORS in identifying and providing
information to assist it in pursuing third parties under 42 C.F.R. § 433.147 (1998). Such
cooperation keeps ORS informed and ensures that the State will not be prejudiced in its
efforts to recover medical benefits. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 18 n.4.
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The State is in a unique position in that its assigned claim is derived from an injury
to the Medicaid recipient. Often the existence of a possible third party, the occurrence of
an accident, or the location of the accident are known to the recipient, but not to ORS.
Mr. McCoy failed to keep the State minimally informed. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 18 n.4.
However, his lack of forthrightness did not prejudice the State's claim against the third
party because he notified both ORS and the third party that he expressly excluded the
Medicaid claim. Id. He also put the proceeds at issue in an attorney's client trust account
until the litigation was resolved. Id. at f 5.
In the instant case, Streight and her counsel failed to cooperate on both accounts.
On June 26, 1998, Streight's father completed a Medicaid Third Party Insurance
questionnaire identifying Sherilyn Christensen as the driver of the vehicle and incorrectly
identifying the driver's insurance carrier as Farmers Insurance (R. 565, 850). Streight
also incorrectly identified a possible third-party insurance carrier as Farmers Insurance in
her application for assistance, including medical assistance on August 3rd, 1998 (R. 223,
229). Finally, in her recertification for assistance form4 executed by Streight's mother
and co-conservator Karen Jensen on September 14th, 1998, Streight identified "Ut State
Farm" as the accident insurance with a notation that this insurer was paying for lost wages
only (R. 238).

4

A recipient who wishes to continue her eligibility for assistance must renew it by
completing and submitting a recertification form in the last month of the current
eligibility period.
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In that same recertification, Streight's mother revealed that she received $571 per
month from Utah Farm Bureau, the correct insurer (R. 236), but failed to reveal the
imminent settlement with Utah Farm Bureau and Ohio Casualty set out in the Petition for
Conservatorship signed by Streight's attorney merely two days later (R.233-240,452459). Ohio Casualty was not mentioned on any documents submitted in Streight's public
assistance application process. Although it may not be intentional and Streight's
conservators were confused about the identity of any insurer, Streight failed to clearly
identify the liable third-party information that was within her knowledge.
More importantly, the applications and questionnaire were a part of Streight's
Department of Workforce Services file along with her application for other assistance in
addition to medical assistance (R. 578). ORS, the State agency designated to pursue
reimbursement; had no knowledge of these documents until January 15,1999 (R. 578).
Defendants argue that Streight cooperated by providing these documents to the
Department of Workforce Services. However, plaintiff is not the Department of
Workforce Services nor is Workforce Services the state agency that administers the Third
Party Liability program on behalf of the Department of Health. ORS, not the Department
of Workforce Services, has adopted the federal requirements regarding a Medicaid
recipient's cooperation. Utah Admin. Code R527-936-2 (1997).
Streight also failed to comply with the cooperation requirement in 42 C.F.R. §
433.147(b)(4) by not paying to the agency (ORS) any support or medical funds that she
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received from the liable third party or segregate the funds into a safe place until the issue
was resolved. Currently, there are no remaining proceeds. All the proceeds were used to
buy a house, in which Streight no longer lives, and seven acres of land (R. 640).
Even though Streight and her conservators may not know the difference between
ORS and the Department of Workforce Services, her legal counsel would know the
difference between governmental agencies when one of those agencies is specifically
identified in a governing statute or rule. Both the cooperation rules and the consent
statute do not contain any ambiguous language and the agencies involved with these rules
and statutes are clearly identified. See Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 2001 UT 109,
f 14, 37 P.3d 1156 (where statute is clear, readily available and accessible to counsel,
strict compliance of notice provision is required).
Streight's incomplete cooperation and her failure to comply with section 26-19-7
prejudiced ORS's ability to choose its method of recovery. Despite ORS's statutory
priority Medicaid lien on all third-party proceeds, Streight's petition for settlement
submitted through her counsel, co-defendant law firm, clearly and succinctly stated that
"[t]here are no other persons interested in Peggy Sue's estate who are entitled to notice
pursuant to law, other than the natural parents and guardians, Bud and Karen Jensen" (R.
452). This was incorrect. Both ORS and the Department of Health had a clearly
identifiable interest in any third party proceeds paid to Streight's estate and were entitled
to notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5-405(2) and 75-5-406.
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The Medicaid recipient cannot engage in a race to the courthouse in order to obtain
all available settlement proceeds without providing any information to ORS or seeking
consent, then claim that it was ORS's own lack of action that prejudiced the Medicaid
claim and not the recipient's less than forthright acts surrounding the settlement of her
own claim against the third party. Even if ORS had been given the correct information,
as required, the statute of limitations to proceed on the Medicaid lien is four years from
the date of the accident or six months from the lastpayment of assistance. Utah Code
Ann. § 26-19-8(l)(b). Once ORS identified the liable third party in January, 1999, it still
had over three years to investigate the facts surrounding the accident and submit its claim
to the third party.
Under the Medical Benefits Recovery Act governing the Third Party Liability
program, the Medicaid recipient must obtain the consent of ORS even before filing a
claim with the third party. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(1 )(a) (1998). A forthright
Medicaid recipient would, upon knowledge of a possible claim contact ORS as soon as
possible, identify the third party and seek consent to include the Medicaid claim in with
her claim. ORS would then need to make a decision. Under subsection 26-19-7(4), it
could choose to offer written consent to the recipient or investigate the case and pursue its
own claim. There are going to be many instances where ORS may choose to pursue its
own claim. For example, if from the beginning of the case, the liability of the third party
is clear and the third party is willing to reimburse Medicaid for medical expenses, ORS
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would have no need to pay an attorney fee to a recipient who is litigating issues
surrounding compensable damages for pain and suffering or future damages. ORS would
receive no benefit from that litigation.
In another example, the Medicaid recipient could wait until the eve of settlement to
contact ORS to identify a possible liable third party or to seek consent, again preventing
ORS from choosing to investigate and pursue its own claim. Such actions would violate
subsection 26-19-7(4), which requires the recipient to seek consent even before filing a
claim with the third party. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(l)(a). The Medical Benefits
Recovery Act was established to require that from the moment the Medicaid recipient has
information and knowledge about a possible third party, she must notify ORS so that ORS
may make an informed choice as to its method of recovery of reimbursement.
In yet another example, the Medicaid recipient could wait until the eve of
settlement before contacting ORS or providing the identifying third-party information and
then demand that if ORS did not reduce or waive its lien, the recipient would not settle
with the third party or would not forward the lien amount to ORS. ORS should not be
required to consent to representation by counsel who have made it clear they consider the
very existence of the ORS lien to be unlawful or is willing to hold up settlement in order
to coerce ORS into reducing the lien amount. ORS would be at a disadvantage if it were
required to be bound by the Medicaid recipient's choice of counsel or was not allowed to
investigate and pursue recovery on its own.
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In sum, federal regulations require that the Medicaid recipient cooperate with ORS
by providing information identifying liable third parties and by forwarding to ORS thirdparty proceeds that legally belong to the State. Streight's and the Sykes law firm's failure
to comply with this requirement has cost the State and the taxpayer-funded assistance
program both its right to pursue the third party directly and the cost of paying its own
attorney fees to seek payment of the lien from the funds already in her hands. She should
not additionally be rewarded by requiring ORS to contribute attorney fees towards her
unlawful acts.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, ORS respectfully requests that the Court affirm the
summary judgment in its favor.
y\d
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Addenda

Addendum A

MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT

26-19-5

(b) The assignment
(1) authorizes the department to submit its claim to the third party
and authorizes payment of benefits directly to the department, and
(n) is effective for all medical assistance
(2) The department may recover the assigned benefits or payments in
accordance with Section 26-19-5 and as otherwise provided by law
(3) The assignment of benefits includes medical support and third party
payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged bv any court of this state or any other
state or territory of the United States That assignment is not m lieu of, and
does not supersede or alter anv other court order, decree, or judgment
(4) When an assignment takes effect, the recipient is entitled to receive
medical assistance, and the benefits paid to the department are a reimbursement to the department
History: C. 1953, 26-19-4.5, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 145, § 2; 1998, ch. 145, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend
ment, effective Mav 4 1998 divided Subsection
(1), making stylistic changes throughout in
Subsection (l)(a) deleted "deemed to be" before
"assigned" and inserted "bv operation ot law"

thereafter and added the language beginning
'regardless of who* at the end, and substituted
a
all medical assistance" for "services that are
paid or to be paid by the department under the
state plan, Section 26-18-10, and Title XIX of
the federal Social Security Act" in Subsection
(D(bXii)

26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third party
— Lien — Notice — Action — Compromise or
waiver — Recipient's right to action protected.
(1) (a) When the department provides or becomes obligated to provide
medical assistance to a recipient because of an injury, disease, or disability
that a third party is obligated to pay for, the department may recover the
medical assistance directly from that third party.
(b) The department's claim to recover medical assistance provided as a
result of the injury, disease, or disability is a hen against any proceeds
payable to or on behalf of the recipient by that third party. This hen has
priority over all other claims to the proceeds, except claims for attorney's
fees and costs authorized under Subsection 26-19-7(4)
(2) The department shall mail or deliver written notice of its hen to the third
party at its principal place of business or last known address. The notice shall
include the recipient's name, the approximate date of injury, a general
description of the type of injury and, if applicable, the general location where
the injury is alleged to have occurred
(3) The department may commence an action on its lien m its own name, but
that hen is not enforceable as to a third party unless:
(a) the third party receives written notice of the department's hen
before it settles with the recipient; or
(b) the department has evidence that the third party had knowledge
that the department provided or was obligated to provide medical assistance.
(4) The department may waive a claim against a third party m whole or in
part, or may compromise, settle, or release a claim or hen.
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an action by a
recipient or a dependent of a recipient for loss or damage not included in the
department's action
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(6) The department's lien on proceeds under this section is not affected by
the transfer of the proceeds to a trust, account, or other financial instrument.
History: C. 1953, 26-19-5, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 34. & 3; 1989, ch. 163, § 2; 1995, ch.
102, § 2; 1998, ch. 145, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1984, ch. 34. $ 3 repealed former $ 26-19-5 (L.
1981, ch. 126, § 18), relating to an action by the
department against a third party or earner,
and enacted present § 26-19-5
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

ment, effective Mav 1,1995, subdivided Subsection (1), inserted "or on Dehalf oF in Subsection
(1Kb), and made stylistic changes throughout
the section.
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998,
m Subsection (l)(a) substituted "obligated to
pay for" for "liable" and made a styhstic change,
and a d d e d Subsection (6).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Applicability.
This section authonzes the state to recover
the medical assistance it has provided when a

third party is liable. Utah Dep't of Social Servs.
v. Higley, 810 P.2d 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

26-19-6. Action by department — Notice to recipient.
(1) Within 30 days after commencing an action under Section 26-19-5, the
department shall give the recipient, his guardian, personal representative,
estate, or survivor, whichever is appropriate, written notice of the action by
personal service or certified mail to the last known address of the person
receiving the notice. Proof of service shall be filed in the action. The recipient
may intervene in the department's action at any time before trial.
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall name the court in which the
action is commenced and advise the recipient of his right to intervene in the
proceeding, his right to obtain a private attorney, and the department's right to
recover medical assistance directly from the third party.
History: C. 1953, 26-19-6, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 18; 1984, ch. 34, § 4; 1985,
ch. 21, § 10.

26-19-7. Action or claim by recipient — Consent of department required — Department's right to intervene — Department's interests protected —
Attorney's fees and costs.
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle,
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of
medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which the department
has provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance,
without the department's written consent.
(b) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in an action
commenced by a recipient for recovery of medical costs connected with the
same injury, disease, or disability, for which it has provided or has become
obligated to provide medical assistance.
(2) (a) If the recipient proceeds without the department's written consent as
required by Subsection ll)(a), the department is not bound by any
decision, judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the
claim or in the action.
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26-19-8

(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party
to which the proceeds were made payable all medical assistance which it
has provided and retains its right to commence an independent action
against the third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3).
(3) The departments written consent, if given, shall state under what terms
,he interests of the department may be represented in an action commenced by
,he recipient.
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for
attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action
that is commenced with the departments written consent.
History: C. 1953, 26-19-7, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 34, § 5; 1989, ch. 163, § 2; 1995, ch.
102, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1984, ch. 34, § 5 repealed former § 26-19-7 (L
1981, ch. 126, § 18), relating to notice of an
action by the department against a third party

or earner, and enacted present § 26-19-7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added the subdivision designations in Subsection (2) and inserted "or any party to which the proceeds were
made payable" in Subsection (2Kb)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Retroactive application.
State consent.
—Costs and attorney fees.
—Proceeding against third party.
Retroactive application.
The 1989 amendment of this section was
intended to clarify the statute m order to encompass all claims resolutions. The amendment was not substantive, and can be applied
retroactively. Utah Dep't of Social Servs. v
Higley, 810 P.2d 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
State consent.
—Costs and attorney fees.
The commencement of an action without
state consent would rule out a state contribu-

tion for costs and attorney fees Camp v Office
of Recovery Servs., 779 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)
Although Subsection (4) may authorize an
award of attorney fees to some Medicaid recipients, the fees must be m connection with the
commencement of an action, and the action
must be commenced with the state's written
consent. Camp v. Office of Recovery Servs., 779
P2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
—Proceeding against third party.
The state is entitled to full, rather than
equitable, reimbursement from a recipient for
all its Medicaid expenditures when the recipient proceeds against a third party without the
state's consent. Camp v. Office of Recovery
Servs , 779 R2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

26-19-8. Statute of limitations — Survival of right of
action — Insurance policy not to limit time allowed for recovery.
(1) (a) An action commenced by the department under this chapter against
a health insurance carrier or employee welfare benefit plan must be
commenced within two years after the date of the injury or onset of the
illness or within six months after the date of the last payment for medical
assistance, whichever is later.
(b) An action against any other third party must be commenced within
four years after the date of the injury or onset of the illness, or within six
months after the date of the last payment for medical assistance, whichever is later.
(2) The death of the recipient does not abate any right of action established
by this chapter.
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tiai for obtaining" meaicai support based on the following :he office snail initiate proceedings to adjust the award
criteria:
pursuant to Sections 78-45-7.2 througn 78-45-7.21.
1. the obligated parent is employed bv an employer
where health insurance is available throuen the employer
References: 78-45-7 through 78-45-7.21, 62A-11-320.5,
at a reasonaole cost, or
2. the ooiigated parent belongs to a group ifor example, a 62A-11-320.6.
History: 13171, AMD, 09/14/92; 19531, AMD, 08715797.
union or professional organization) where group health
insurance is available to members of the group at a
R527-337. Repealed.
reasonaole cost, and
3. ail of the following conditions are present:
History: 18678, REP. 04/08/97.
a. the children are not presently enrolled in an adequate
health insurance plan,
b. there is a probability that employment or group R527-475. State Tax Refund Intercept.
membership will last long enough that coverage will sig- R527-475-1. State Tax Refund Intercept.
nificantly help meet the chiid(ren/s medical or dental
needs,
R527-475-1. State Tax Refund Intercept.
c. the child support order is a judicial order,
1. Pursuant to Section 59-10-529(1), the Office of Recovd. the obligated parent is currently paying the child
ery Services may intercept a state tax refund to recover
support amount as ordered,
e. it is probable that the medical insurance would benefit delinquent child support. For a state tax refund to be
intercepted, there must be an administrative or judicial
the child(ren), and
judgment with a balance owing. An installment of child
f. in a Non-AFDC Non-Medicaid case, the obligee has
support is considered a judgment for purposes of Section
consented to the attempt to modify the court order.
59-10-529 on and after the date it becomes due as provided
in Section 30-3-10.6.
References: 62A-11-326, 78-45-7.1.
2. State tax refunds intercepted will be applied to satisfy
History; 10430, NEW. 02/01/90; 13102, AMD. 09/02/92; obligations owed to the state and collected by the Office of
15462, AMD, 03/22/94; 17503, AMD, 02/22/96; 18355, 5YR, Recovery Services before any of the funds are applied to
12/09/96; 18575, AMD, 03/18/97.
Non-AFDC arrearages. In accordance with 45 CFR
303.102, Non-AFDC obligees must be notified upon application for child support services that state tax reninds
R527-263. Collection of Child Support Judgments.
intercepted will not be applied to arrearages owed to thai
obligee until all obligations owed to the state and ^Ijerted
R527-253-1. Collection of Child Support Judgments.
by the Office of Recovery Services have been paid in fulL
3. The Office of Recovery Services shall notary the ontifsr
R527-253-1. Collection of Child Support Judgments.
1. The office may demand and collect immediate pay- and the unobligated spouse that the state tax refund has
ment in full, or may demand and collect payments that will been received by the Office. The notice shall advsw the
result in payment in full within a period of time that is unobligated spouse of his right to receive a portion of the
deemed to meet the interests of the state in child support tax refund if the unobligated spouse had earnings and filed
jointly with the obligor. If the unobligated spouse does not
judgment matters.
2. The office may set or reset a schedule of payments to want his share of the tax refund to be applied to the
pay a child support judgment that is equal to 50% of the obligated spouse's child support debt, the unobligated
current support award to meet the requirement of Section spouse shall make a written request and submit a copy of
the tax return and W-2*s to the office within 25 days of the
62A-ll-32(XlXa).
date
the office sends the notice. The unobligated spouse's
3. The office may collect a child support judgment
through income withholding, liens, tax refund intercepts, portion of the joint tax refund will be prorated according to
and any other legal remedy available. Initiation of a the percentage of income reported on the W-2 forma for the
particular remedy shall not limit the office from initiating tax year. If the unobligated spouse does not make a written
request to the office to obtain his share of the tax refund
any other remedy at the same time.
within the specified time -limit, the office shall not be
required to pay any portion of the tax refund to the
References: 62A-11-320.
unobligated spouse.
History: 13175, AMD, 09/14/92; 18948, 5YR, 04/16797;
18944, AMD, 06704/97.
References: 59-10-529, 30-3-10.6.
History: 10521, AMD, 03/20/90; 10690, NSC, 04/26/90;
R627-255. Change in Circumstances.
16951, 5YR, 06715795; 18589, AMD, 03/19/97.
R527-255-1. Change in Circumstances.
R527-800. Enforcement Procedures.
R527-255-1. Change in Circumstances.
R527-800-1. Purpose and Authority.
1. If the change in circumstances is temporary; defined as R527-800-2. Credit of Tax Refund.
less than 6 months in prospective duration, the current R527-800-3. Garnishment of Wages.
support order shall not be modified.
R527-800-4. Acquisition and Disposition of Real Property.
2. If the change in circumstances is more extended, R527-800-5. Sale of Real Property.
defined as 6 to 12 months in prospective duration, the office R527-800-6. Liens, Cost of Sale.
has the discretion to determine whether the change IB R527-800-7. Sanctions, Retained Support.
minimal such that the original order should not be ad- R527-800-8. Sanction, Medical Support, TPL, Paternity.
justed, or significant enough to justify initiating proceedings to adjust the award pursuant to Sections 78-45-7.2
R527-800-1. Purpose and Authority.
through 78-45-7.21.
A. Purpose
3. If the change m circumstances is long term or permaEnforcement *rtiftns may be initiated when:
nent, denned as over 12 months in prospective duration,
1. Tne obligor has agreed.
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2. The obligor is entitled to a federal or state income tax
refund which may be applied to certain debts under specinc
Federal and State statute.
3. The obligor has failed to make payments on the debt
and the agency has information regarding the obligor's
income and/or assets.
B. Authority
Section 62A-11-104 charges the Office of Recovery Services with the duty to collect money due the department.
Enforcement actions snail be initiated m accordance with
the specific statutory authority provided under specinc
state statute and in accordance with the Criminal Code,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Uniform Probate Code and
the Judicial Code Utah Code Annotated.
R527-800-2. Credit of Tax Refund.
The office may credit an overpayment of taxes toward a
judgment owed to the state, in accordance with Section
59-10-529.
R527-80O-3. Garnishment of Wages.
The department may garnish wages in accordance with
Rule 64D, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
R527-800-4. Acquisition and Disposition of Real
Property.
A The department may acquire property in payment for
an obligation by:
1. voluntary conveyance.
2. conveyance by heirs; or
3. execution.
B. Acquisition of real property is an action of last resort.
C. Voluntary conveyance shall be by Warranty or Quit
Claim Deed in favor of the department.
D. Property owned by the state is tax exempt in accordance with Section 59-2-1101.
R527-80O-5. Sale of Real Property.
A, Certified appraisals and preliminary title reporta may
be requested.
B. The department will not provide title insurance. The
State will clear all back taxes and encumbrances from the
property at the time of closing.
R527-800-6. Liana, Coat of Sale.
The costs of sale which are allowed are those provided in
62A-11-111.
R527-800-7. HaiMTtiona, Retained Support.
In accordance with 45 CFR 232.12(d), if a recipient
incurred a Retained Support obligation and mils to either
make an agreement to pay the debt or makes an agreement
and defaults, a sanction for non-cooperation must be imposed if the obligor is currently receiving AFDC.
R527-80O-8. Sanction, Medical Support, TPL, Paternity.
In accordance with 42 CFR 433.147-148 a recipient of
medical assistance must cooperate with the state agency in
providing information regarding Third Party Liability,
establishment of paternity for children to ntaMish medical
support liability, and in utilizing all available third party

R527-936-5 (10/97)

resources to offset medicaid expenditures. Failure to cooperate will result in the recipient being removed from the
medical assistance case.
References: 62A-1M11, 62A-9-130, 62A-9-131, 62A-11104, 62A-1M10.
History: 12110, AMD, 10/31/91; 12111, AMD, 10/31/91;
12112, NSC, 10/15791; 12113, NSC, 10/15791; 18109, 5YR,
09/24/96; 18110, AMD, 11/16796: 18277, NSC, 05/19/97.
R527-936. Third Party Liability, Medicaid.
R527-936-1.
R527-936-2.
R527-936-3.
R527-936-4.
R527-936-5.

Definition and Purpose.
Authority.
Assignment of Benefits.
Cooperation as a Condition of Eligibility.
Payor of Last Resort.

R527-936-1. Definition and Purpose.
A third party is any individual, entity, or program that is
or may be liable to pay all or part of the medical cost of
injury, disease or disability of a Medicaid recipient. Tne
Utah Third Party Liability Program has been —t-Mf**™*4
to assure that all private medical resources have been
exhausted before a claim is paid by Medicaid; or that when
the agency discovers a liable third party after payment of a
claim, reimbursement is sought.
R527-936-2. Authority.
Federal Regulations 42 CFR 433.135 through 433.154
a Third Party liability Program, and specify the requirements for a state plan concerning Third Party Liability.
The office adopts these sections and incorporates thssn by
reference. Sections 26-19-1 through 26-19-18 aiilhsaiui a
Third Party Liability Medicaid Recovery
establish the legal liabilities of third parties audi
R827-936-3. Assignment of Benefits.
Federal regulations 42 CFR 433.145 and 433.146 apecify
the applicant/recipient responsibility to assign their righto
to third party payments as a condition of eligibility;
R827-9364. Cooperation aa a Conation of nUa^bOity.
The applicant/recipient must cooperate in estssnmhing
paternity and obtaining medical support and other third
party payments as spooned in 42 CFR 433.147. Office of
Recovery Services will initiate sanctions for i
tion in accordance with the Federal regulations i
procedures.
RS27-&3M. Payor of Last
Medicaid shall be the payor of last resort aa specated m
42 CFR 433.138, 42 CFR 433.139, and Subsection 26-1810(4).
Reference*: 28-19-1 through 18, 26-18-8,28-18-10(4).
History: 12124, NSC, 10/15/91; 12125, NSC* 1Q05V91;
12126, NSC, 10/15/91; 12158. AMD, 12/06791; 18148,5YR,
lQffll/96; 18146, AMD, 11/16796.

42 CFR§ 433.147
42 C.F.R. § 433.147
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
TITLE 42 -PUBLIC HEALTH
CHAPTER IV-HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
SUBCHAPTER C-MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
PART 433-STATE FISCAL ADMINISTRATION
SUBPART D--THIRD PARTY LIABILITY
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS TO BENEFITS
§ 433.147 Cooperation in establishing paternity and in obtaining medical support and payments and
in identifying and providing information to assist in pursuing third parties who may be liable to pay.

(a) Scope of requirement. The agency must require the individual who assigns his or her rights to
cooperate in~

(1) Establishing paternity of a child born out of wedlock and obtaining medical support and
payments for himself or herself and any other person for whom the individual can legally assign
rights, except that individuals described in section 1902(1)(1)(A) of the Act (poverty level pregnant
women) are exempt from these requirements involving paternity and obtaining medical support and
payments from, or derived from, the father of the child born out of wedlock; and

(2) Identifying and providing information to assist the Medicaid agency in pursuing third parties who
may be liable to pay for care and services under the plan.

(b) Essentials of cooperation. As part of a cooperation, the agency may require an individual to—

(1) Appear at a State or local office designated by the agency to provide information or evidence
relevant to the case;

(2) Appear as a witness at a court or other proceeding;

(3) Provide information, or attest to lack of information, under penalty of perjury;

(4) Pay to the agency any support or medical care funds received that are covered by the assignment
of rights; and

(5) Take any other reasonable steps to assist in establishing paternity and securing medical support
and payments, and in identifying and providing information to assist the State in pursuing any liable
third party.

(c) Waiver of cooperation for good cause. The agency must waive the requirements in paragraphs
(a) and (b) of this section if it determines that the individual has good cause for refusing to cooperate.

(1) With respect to establishing paternity of a child born out of wedlock or obtaining medical care
support and payments, or identifying or providing information to assist the State in pursuing any
liable third party for a child for whom the individual can legally assign rights, the agency must find
the cooperation is against the best interests of the child, in accordance with factors specified for the
Child Support Enforcement Program at 45 CFR part 232. If the State title F/-A agency has made a
finding that good cause for refusal to cooperate does or does not exist, the Medicaid agency must
adopt that finding as its own for this purpose.

(2) With respect to obtaining medical care support and payments for an individual and identifying
and providing information to assist in pursuing liable third parties in any case not covered by
paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the agency must find that cooperation is against the best interests
of the individual or the person to whom Medicaid is being furnished because it is anticipated that
cooperation will result in reprisal against, and cause physical or emotional harm to, the individual
or other person.

(d) Procedures for waiving cooperation. With respect to establishing paternity, obtaining medical
care support and payments, or identifying and providing information to assist the State in pursuing
liable third parties for a child for whom the individual can legally assign rights, the agency must use
the procedures specified for the Child Support Enforcement Program at 45 CFR part 232. With

respect to obtaining medical care support and payments or to identifying and providing information
to assist the State in pursuing liable third parties for any other individual, the agency must adopt
procedures similar to those specified in 45 CFR part 232, excluding those procedures applicable only
to children.

[55 FR 48606, Nov. 21, 1990; 58 FR 4907. Jan. 19, 1993]
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